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The Rising: Ireland: Easter 1916. By Fearghal McGarry. New
York: Oxford University Press, 2010. ISBN: 978-0-19-280186-9.
Notes. Bibliography. Index. Photographs. Maps. Pp. xiv, 365.
$29.95.
Guerrilla Warfare in the Irish War of Independence, 1919–
1921. By Joseph McKenna. Jefferson, NC and London:
McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2011. ISBN: 978-07864-5947-6. Ebook ISBN: 978-0-7864-8519-2. Appendices.
Notes. Bibliography. Index. Photographs. Maps. Pp. x, 290.
$65.00.
These complementary works are among two of the most recent efforts to
make use of the nearly 1,800 interviews conducted by the Irish government's Bureau of Military History starting in 1947, but not made available
to historians until 2003. The witness statements collected by the Bureau
comprise 36,000 pages of evidence and more than 150,000 documents
chronicling the personal experiences of Irish citizens and soldiers during
the events of the early 20th century through the War of Independence.
Together, these books provide a chronological story of the Easter Rising
and the War of Independence.
Unfortunately, no subsequent volume is likely to conclude what would be
an obvious trilogy with the completion of a new study of the Irish Civil
War based on the Bureau's collection. Interviewers seldom questioned
witnesses about their role in that sad affair, the wounds of which festered
among families and neighbors for many years afterwards, and which
remains to this day an unfit subject for discussion among many in Ireland. Despite the Bureau's short-sighted decision to ignore the Civil War
in its interviews, historians must be grateful for the work that was done to
preserve accounts of the Rising and the War of Independence.
Though very different books, these works provide an interesting and useful glimpse into how those interviews can enhance our understanding of
the events. Lessons applicable to students and professionals in the fields
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of Intelligence and Counterterrorism are apparent throughout both
books; and like many subsequent leaders of wars of national liberation,
students and professionals would do well likewise to note the universality
of goals, strategies, and tactics. Weaponry, it seems, is mostly what differentiates the efforts of Irish men and women to win their freedom from the
efforts of Ho Chi Minh to unite his country. Parallels with today's insurgencies should also not be lost on us.
Fearghal McGarry's book is the stronger of the two. A Senior Lecturer in
History at Queen's University, Belfast, McGarry provides a tale of the
Easter Rising of 1916 that is effectively organized, highly insightful, and
exceedingly well-written. McGarry does not attempt a full historical
account of the Rising, and for that purpose one would do well to consult
Charles Townshend's Easter 1916: The Irish Rebellion, published by
Penguin in 2005. Instead, his stated purpose is to "convey how the
rebellion was experienced, particularly by ordinary Volunteers and
civilians…." (p. 124). He is too modest. He does much more than that,
starting with a lucid account of the events that shaped the generation of
Irishmen destined to live during the seminal period that marked a
watershed in the course of Irish history. He first recognizes the pitfalls of
using the Bureau's interviews as sources, noting how certain memories
create "retrospectively…a sense of meaning in the narrative of one's own
life…" and cloud the "multitude of influences" (p. 39) that shaped
individual politicization. For many ordinary citizens, McGarry claims,
that politicization encompassed a hostility to Britain, the embrace of a
distinctive Irish culture, and "a commitment to an abstract ideal of Irish
freedom" (p. 41).
McGarry next chronicles the rise of a fighting force capable of sustaining a
war of national liberation, starting with the response to the Ulster Unionist formation of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). It now seems odd in
retrospect, but some republicans of the day celebrated the formation of
the UVF as at least some measure of resistance to British authority. Many
did not take it seriously, failing to recognize it as a real step towards the
radicalization of Unionism. Still, the counter to that force was the formation of the Irish Volunteers, quickly infiltrated at top leadership levels by
the more militant Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB). Founders of the
Volunteers saw their organization as a bulwark against the threat posed
by the UVF, while IRB leaders among the Volunteers viewed their army as
the foundation for insurrection.
McGarry uses this opportunity to bring in the Bureau's interviews to
describe the social structure of the Volunteers. The absence of "people of
importance" (p. 60) among the top leaders led some authorities to under62
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estimate the threat posed by the Irish Volunteers. Though the average
Volunteer was of modest social standing, the same was not so true for the
women of Cumann na mBan, an auxiliary group formed to support the
all-male Volunteers. McGarry provides less insight into the much smaller
Irish Citizen Army (ICA), a socialist labor force then led by James Connolly. In socialist fashion, women were welcomed among its ranks as
fighters, providing opportunities for zealous radicals like Countess Constance Markievicz to don a fashionable ICA uniform and wield an oversized revolver.
No matter their social status or their aims, those who took up arms
against British rule in 1916 were deeply motivated, but by what? McGarry
tackles that question by relying again on the accounts of participants. Historians have often responded to that question by citing the embrace of
Patrick Pearse's ideas of a blood-sacrifice redeeming the Irish nation;
such ideas have an appeal, considering the deeply religious nature of Irish
society at that time. The futility of such an ill-armed, badly trained, and
strategically inept force standing up to the might of the British Empire
would seem to support the notion that the Rising was little more than
mass suicide. Yet, McGarry points out, at the time the rebellion was
planned, Pearse was too minor a character among the Volunteers to have
had such influence on the decision to act. It seems more likely that ideas
revolving around German assistance that might lead to success were seriously considered. Or, in the event of the rebels' defeat and a German victory on the Continent, the claim to a seat at the table when a peace
conference ended The Great War was possible. But even those reasons are
less likely than two simple facts. The necessity for an insurrection during
the First World War, while Britain was taxed on the Western Front, was a
"rational…moral and historical imperative if Fenianism was to retain any
credibility or future" (p. 98). In addition, there was an emotional component as well, "born out of frustration, shame, and pessimism" (p. 98).
McGarry also poses the question of how the authorities failed to predict
the onset of the Rising. The finger must be glaringly pointed at the British
Intelligence system. It comprised no less than five separate intelligencegathering bodies, most of which failed to share information with one
another, but strangely too, failed to share it even with those in Dublin
Castle who might have acted on it. In a comment that could reflect any
number of more recent intelligence failures, McGarry notes that in addition to the convoluted bureaucracy, the failure stemmed more from an
inability to act on the information possessed, rather than from a lack of
information itself. The Irish police forces also come in for criticism in that
they failed to devote proper resources to intelligence-gathering. Again
echoing modern parallels, one sees that the speed at which intelligence
63
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information is gathered, analyzed, disseminated, and acted upon is key to
success. Only one human source provided advance warning of the Rising,
and that information was still navigating the police bureaucracy two days
later when the event came to pass. Ultimately, though, McGarry places
blame on the political leaders in Dublin Castle who had it within their
power to reform the intelligence processes then in use.
Despite all the discussion about motivation and rationale for the Rising,
the fact remains that all those factors applied only to those who actually
came out during Easter Week—only a small percentage of the number of
Volunteers on the rolls. Only about a thousand Volunteers mobilized
initially, with another three hundred or so falling in over the next few
days. Although there was initial disagreement among some Volunteer
leaders about the rectitude of their judgment, and miscommunication
about whether or not to mobilize, once the event was underway, what kept
so many Volunteers at home? No one has satisfactorily answered that
question. On the other hand, what prompted one young soldier from the
Royal Irish Rifles, home on leave in Dublin, to respond to a call to return
to his barracks by reporting instead to his family home and joining his two
Volunteer brothers? "'My mother put her arms around me,' he recalled,
'God bless you, I knew you would do it,' and she burned my British
uniform" (p. 126).
Unified leadership and a more militant ethos led to about two-thirds of
Connolly's ICA turning out. It was a much higher percentage than the Volunteers, but it amounted only to another 219 men and woman under
arms. One is left to speculate kindly that most of the Volunteers viewed
their chances of success more rationally and were not so zealous as to
allow their enthusiasm to overwhelm their common sense. Yet, had it not
been for those who made the sacrifice, it is highly questionable whether
Mr. McKenna would have had anything to write about in the next book
under review here. Fortunately for Ireland, a good showing of committed
republicans turned out to see what they could do for Kate Houlihan in
1916.
Finally, it was the legacy of the Rising that set the stage for the next step in
Ireland's freedom from British rule and its evolution as a nation. Without
the Rising, McGarry states, "Irish nationalism would not have united
under the banner of republicanism," previously considered by most to be
an extreme and unattainable goal. The Rising also revived and legitimized
"the physical force tradition" in Ireland. Finally, though not the subject of
these books, the Rising undermined the possibility of compromise, thus
leading directly to the onset of the Irish Civil War. Those committed to a
republic could not settle on an Irish Free State. Meanwhile, in 1919, Irish
64
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men and women were again prepared to strike a blow for freedom, this
time far more successfully.
Joseph McKenna, former senior assistant librarian in the Central Library
at Birmingham, England, takes up that story and makes very different use
of the Bureau of Military History statements, liberally interspersing material from more traditional accounts, such as the widely familiar memoirs
of Tom Barry, Dan Breen, and Ernie O'Mally. McKenna also brings more
of the British perspective into his work, using resources from the Public
Records Office in London, as well as Parliamentary Papers. His book is of
a different caliber than McGarry's in that McKenna allows the sources to
speak largely for themselves with less context and historical analysis. It is
less a book of ideas than a book of facts, though they are interesting ones
and generally well presented. It is also replete with first-hand observations from participants in the events that followed the 1916 Rising, and
that in itself is of much value to readers.
McKenna begins with a chapter that briefly summarizes the events of Easter Week, 1916. He then moves on to a discussion of political and military
reorganization in two following chapters. Of the Rising, McKenna notes
that the harsh treatment and executions of the Irish leaders set the tone
for a vital change in public sentiment that would be necessary in an ensuing war of independence. British prison camps became "the universities of
Republicanism" (p. 39), binding men to their cause and enabling the revitalization of an army in Ireland upon their release and return home. The
Conscription Bill that passed in the spring of 1918, when the final result of
the First World War was still very much undecided, was the issue that led
most directly to widespread public opposition to British governance. The
threat of conscription provided an immeasurable boost to the Irish Volunteers, poised to defend against that threat by force. In the end, force
proved unnecessary, and the war ended without conscription being
enacted in Ireland. Nevertheless, the Irish Volunteers (known subsequently as the Irish Republican Army (IRA)) continued to evolve into an
effective force. Structural changes at the General Headquarters level led
to a focus on propaganda with the creation of a department for that purpose. McKenna notes that the War of Independence was "perhaps the first
modern war where propaganda…was to play a major part…in shaping
opinion…." (p. 51).
Most importantly, before that evolving army could take up arms to
dispute British rule in Ireland, the transition of public opinion from
apathy to support was first required. That support built slowly, with
resentment against the British, as noted above, resulting from their
treatment of the leaders of 1916 and the threat of compelling Irishmen to
65
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fight the Germans. The anti-conscription campaign was the first major
step in converting the populace to the practice of passive resistance. Irish
labor unions added to that resistance with a series of general strikes.
Eventually, the height of resistance was reached by "just ignoring the
British system" (p. 71) when Republican courts began to administer
justice throughout Ireland.
Once war began, many of the successes or failures hinged on the outcome
of the intelligence war, which is also the title of another chapter in the
book. McKenna, like McGarry, notes that British failures were attributable to the existence of multiple intelligence organizations with overlapping functions, "but little exchange of information" (p. 79). That failure of
communication played a significant role in Irish successes, and the fact
that the problem persisted even after the failures of 1916 is a lesson that
should not be lost on modern intelligence professionals. Largely, though,
the story of the intelligence war is an age-old tale, with successes on both
sides owing mostly to the use of informants. With hundreds of Irish citizens in the employ of Dublin Castle, it stood to reason that some would
supply information to the IRA, which ultimately got the best of the British
as a result. Perhaps most importantly, it allowed the IRA to exercise some
measure of control over the capital. The propaganda value of successful
attacks in Dublin was significant. Attacks in the city undermined British
authority and demonstrated to the world that Britain was not even "in
control of the most heavily patrolled city in the world" (p. 97).
Discussion of the war years progresses through three chapters, each
devoted separately to one year of the conflict, starting with the
Soloheadbeg Ambush on January 21, 1919, and ending with the truce and
eventual Anglo-Irish Treaty of December 6, 1921. These chapters follow
the war's events from the first-hand accounts of the participants. Actions
consisted primarily of raids on Royal Irish Constabulary (RCI) barracks to
obtain arms, or ambushes of RIC or British Army troops at opportune
positions along rural Irish roads. Earlier in the war, the need for arms and
munitions dictated Volunteer efforts. Later, attacks on Crown forces
intensified.
McKenna points out some failures that were largely attributable to a lack
of experience and training. In one case, Volunteers captured an officer of
the coastguard garrison at Castletownberre Station. They failed to search
him, and at an appropriate moment the officer pulled a revolver and
wounded several of his would-be captors. In another failed effort, Volunteers returned to an ambush site three days running in an effort to catch
an expected motorized army patrol. Instead, their presence must have
been revealed by some observer, and the ambushers soon found them66
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selves on the receiving end of a British ambush. Still, the nature of the war
favored the Volunteers, who derived support from the local population
and could melt away into the towns or countryside after a successful
ambush.
As more and more Volunteers were identified or suspected of insurrection
and unable to return to their homes, flying columns of such men were
formed on the Boer War model. Instead of acting in an individual and
uncoordinated fashion, these men formed a standing body of troops able
to act much more decisively. The flying column, McKenna claims, is what
evened the odds between the smaller number of Volunteers and the overwhelming numbers of Crown forces. The flying columns around the country eventually grew large enough to take on sizable contingents of British
forces and prevail. Their knowledge of the country and an active intelligence capability typically enabled them to avoid even large-scale British
attempts to surround and destroy them. The story is an eerily familiar
one. One could undoubtedly substitute any number of names for "Irish"
and "British" and tell much the same tale.
McKenna concludes with precisely that observation regarding the legacy
of the Irish War of Independence, claiming that it served as the model for
the eventual downfall of British Imperialism (though he fails to credit the
impact of World War II as contributing to that trend). Accounts of the war
were required reading at many military academies. In less formal settings,
other revolutionaries of the 20th century made a similar study of the subject. It served them well. The difficulties of countering wars of national
liberation persist.
Both of these books are worth reading for the perspective they provide on
all the myriad facets of revolutionary thoughts, ideologies, politics, and
military actions that still ring true today. Perhaps no more telling indication of that is McKenna's quote from the Lord Mayor of Cork, Terrence
MacSwiney, who observed in 1920 that "It is not those who can inflict the
most, but those who can suffer the most who will conquer" (p. 132). Ho
Chi Minh must have watched the events unfolding in Ireland with keen
interest.
Edward J. Hagerty, Ph.D., American Public University
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